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ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY. By William N. Nelson. Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1980. Pp. ix, 176. $16.95. 
Political philosophers have long searched for a rational basis for 
belief in democracy. Traditionally, they have defended democracy 
on procedural grounds such as the fundamental procedural equity .of 
the system, the need for popular participation in government, and 
the need for popular sovereignty.1 William Nelson's On Just!fying 
.Democracy attacks these traditional justifications and proposes its 
own basis for belief in democracy. According to Nelson, democracy 
is presumptively the best form of government because it is most 
likely to produce morally correct decisions. While Nelson's ap-
proach is innovative because of its substantive rather than proce-
I. See, e.g., K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) (popular 
sovereignty justifies democracy); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 
(1962) (an economic justification of democracy); C. COHEN, DEMOCRACY (1971) (suggesting 
that everyone affected by a decision should participate in the decision-making process); A. 
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (economic justification); R. NoZic~. 
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (suggesting that government exists to provide people 
with that to which they are "entitled"); J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DE-
MOCRACY (3rd ed. 1950) (participation, in itself, is a desirable goal); P. SINGER, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISOBEDIENCE (1973) (defending procedural fairness as a)ustification for democracy). 
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dural underpinnings, his argument for democracy 1s ultimately 
unconvincing. 
Nelson devotes a good deal of space to attacking each of the 
traditional justifications of democracy. These first five chapters, 
however, are not the focal point of the book and rely heavily on the 
works of earlier philosophers.2 The core of Nelson's argument is 
that an individual has no obligation to obey a morally unjustified 
law.3 The procedural fairness of a system is thus irrelevant if that 
system routinely enacts unjust legislation (p. 30). 
After establishing this premise, Nelson next develops his argu-
ment that democracy, by its very nature, will produce morally defen-
sible rules. An account of what constitutes "moral" rules is 
obviously central to Nelson's thesis. For the utilitarian, moral rules 
maximize aggregate or average happiness. John Rawls defines moral 
rules as those that individuals will adopt under a condition of ideal 
ignorance. In contrast, Nelson defines moral rules functionally, 
maintaining that they must possess three properties: 
(1) Compliance with the principles tends to produce benefits or prevent 
harm; (2) The properties could serve as the shared, public principles 
constituting a stable, 'fundamental charter of a well-ordered human 
association' as Rawls understands this notion; and (3) The principles 
could perform this function in a society of free and independent per-
sons. [Pp. 109-10.] 
Although the first condition resembles the utilitarian view that a 
moral rule best maximizes happiness, it is in fact much weaker. Nel-
son means simply that the rules must be intended to promote bene-
fits or prevent harms, not that they actually have this aggregate 
effect.4 The second factor - that the rules are capable of generating 
and perpetuating consensus-lies at the heart of Nelson's definition 
of moral rules.5 Nelson thinks that the requirement that the rules 
represent a consensus that would endure over time "will tend to rule 
out some seemingly unfair sets of principles," such as those espoused 
by the racist (p. 106). The third condition - that free and independ-
ent persons generally accept the rules - is designed to exclude from 
Nelson's definition of morality the situation where "slaves are so de-
humanized that they would accept the slaveholders' rationale for 
their common institutions" (p. 106). On Justtfying .Democracy argues 
2. The uninitiated would probably benefit more from the original justifications than from 
Nelson's truncated synopses. 
3. One must note the distinction between a justifiable institutional form and a justifiable 
law. Although a specific law enacted by a democracy may not be morally justified, a citizen 
will tend to obey the commands of an institution - democracy- that is morally justified. P. 
107. 
4. Thus, Nelson nowhere discusses whether democratically adopted rules, individually or 
on the whole, maximize happiness. Pp. 102-03, 109. 
5. Nelson acknowledges that almost all of his discussion of what constitutes a well-ordered 
society is borrowed from Rawls. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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that democracy will tend to generate rules that meet these three crite-
ria because "public functionaries will attempt to develop cogent jus~ 
tifi.cations for their policies; and these justifications will have to be 
capable of gaining widespread acceptance" (p. 116). 
Nelson's justification of democracy is inadequate in several fun-
damental respects.6 First, many will find his assessment of the polit-
ical process in modem democracies highly unrealistic. Political 
campaigns often seem more notable for their advertising techniques 
than for the coherence or depth of their policy justifications. Second, 
Nelson's defense of democracy is almost tautological. Democracy, 
by definition, requires that widespread support exist for enacted 
rules. Suspiciously, Nelson has defined moral rules as those that 
could produce a consensus. Of course, there may be differences be-
tween rules that command (roughly) majority support and those that 
can maintain a stable consensus. On Just!fying .Democracy, however, 
does not develop the notion of "consensus" and says little about the 
substantive features that a "stable" rule must possess. Because Nel-
son has not adequately discussed how moral rules can be distin-
guished from democratically adopted rules, his argument claims, 
justifi.es, and illuminates very little. 
Most readers are also likely to find Nelson's definition of moral-
ity unsatisfying. At one point, he posits that a rule "can be objec-
tively just or unjust" (p. 5). Yet by the end of the book, he is arguing 
that "a set of principles is an adequate morality only when it repre-
sents a possible consensus among free and independent people" (p. 
106). What was originally an objective definition of morality be-
comes what many will regard as subjective. If an unbiased consen-
sus holds something to be just, it becomes, under Nelson's definition, 
objectively just. Thus, where a group of free and independent indi-
viduals constituting ninety-nine percent of a society adopts a rule 
that represses the remainder of the society, Nelson might be commit-
ted to describing that rule as moral. Many will be distressed by such 
a description. 
There are other disturbing aspects to Nelson's argument. For in-
stance, he often seems to impose different standards on his own the-
ory than he does on those of others. When discussing the 
"participation" justification for democracy. he notes that "[i]t is not 
true that everyone wants to play an active role in political decision-
making" (p. 47). Yet when he presents his own theory, Nelson insists 
that "[m]ost people are concerned about the opinions of others" (p. 
108). Although both statements are possibly true, it is not immedi-
ately clear that the first suggestion ought to be rejected out-of-hand, 
6. In addition to the argumentative deficiencies, there are also occasional stylistic difficul-
ties. See, e.g., p. 105 (A system "is an adequate system if it satisfies the conditions of adequacy 
for systems of its type."). 
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while the second ought to be accepted without support. Such vary-
ing standards for different theories give Nelson's position the veneer 
of unassailability, but they detract from the persuasiveness of his 
effort. 
Perhaps this assessment of Nelson's work is too harsh. Nelson 
necessarily covers a large amount of philosophical ground in a short 
space. He has, at the very least, presented an interesting viewpoint 
from which to evaluate political systems. Such a presentation is, in 
itself, no small accomplishment. What Nelson does not achieve, 
however, is a satisfactory demonstration of the superiority of polit-
ical democracy. Due to its ambiguous and questionable definition of 
morality, On Justifying .Democracy fails to persuade one that democ-
racy produces truly moral rules. It succeeds only in suggesting a new 
basis on which political democracy may someday be justified. It is 
left to a later author to provide a compelling justification of this sort. 
